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Chapter 5 
The Case for Moral Complexity 
Marc Fellman 
 
Editor’s Introduction 
 
Via an alternative route to the one taken by Nussbaum, Marc Fellman reaches similar 
conclusions to her’s, but the focus of his concerns is somewhat different. He too is a 
particularist, focusing his attention on how to morally respond to specific others, how 
to be responsible to them, given their specific circumstances, adverse circumstances in 
particular. How we respond to others both expresses and determines our moral 
understandings. His primary case study is the Holocaust and, reletedly, the 
relationship between Hanna and Michael in The Reader. One crucial way of 
determining how to respond, including how to judge, involves the imaginative exercise 
of putting ourselves in another’s shoes. Doing this, Fellman believes, will allow us to 
be more compassionate or, in Nussbaum’s preferred vocabulary, merciful. Fellman 
spends some time showing us how the complex weave of practices of responding to 
others often leads us, to put things in Walzer’s preferred terms, to get dirty hands; to 
be forced to do something bad in order to bring a good about. Of course, the case of 
perpetrators of the Holocaust is somewhat different. Their primary aims were deeply 
reprehensible. But complexity, which includes our vulnerability to circumstances 
which invite us to respond in certain ways, often lead to moral failings, even failings 
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that ovewhelm our capacity to understand. Our recognition of this complexity, of the 
moral complexity of living humanly, should incline us to judge with care, even in the 
light of the moral enormity of the Holocaust. Michael’s complex relationship with 
Hanna paradigmatically embodies the complexity involved in our moral 
understandings of serious wrongdoing, understanding which involves judgment, but 
not merely judgment. Brian Penrose and Ward Jones’ contributions nicely 
complement Fellman’s piece. 
 
There is a passage in Bernhard Schlink’s The Reader1 in which the problem of the tension 
between judging and understanding is crystallized. It arrives at a moment in the story when 
the central character, Michael, comes to the conclusion that simultaneously understanding 
and condemning the crimes that his former lover had committed was possibly an 
impossible task. For Michael, and in particular because of his past relationship with the 
former camp guard, Hanna, it is as if the tension itself resists being accommodated, or even 
accorded a satisfactory coherency, within his moral worldview. 
I hope to shed some light on Michael’s predicament by situating the tension 
between judging and understanding, as it is understood in The Reader, within the context of 
a discussion on another powerful tension, that between moral complexity and moral 
enormity in Holocaust experiences. That is to say, I think that there are some interesting 
parallels between the two tensions. An important claim with respect to my argument is that 
the Holocaust more broadly, though not unlike Michael’s personal quandary, represents a 
genuine moral problem. On the one hand, the Holocaust appears to encapsulate the 
paradigm case of evil while it is also the case that the Holocaust is a modern, human 
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phenomenon, the very complexity of which can have the effect of placing into question our 
capacity in such matters as judgment. Put another way, enormity analyses, that is analyses 
that foreground the moral enormity of the Holocaust, demand that we judge and ascribe 
responsibility, yet, for equally urgent reasons complexity analyses compel us to understand 
the whys and wherefores of human actions. 
First I will expand on the form of the problem of the tension between enormity and 
complexity, whilst paying particular attention to establishing the presence and parameters 
of moral complexity within both individual moral experiences of the Holocaust and the 
Holocaust itself as a defining event. My core concern here is to establish to what extent 
there is a tension between moral complexity and enormity. 
Specifically, I will argue that moral complexity is informed, in large part, by a 
variety of understandings of responsibility. My claim will be that it is the various 
understandings of, and issues arising from, responsibility, that are of prime importance to 
understanding both moral complexity itself and the tension that arises between complexity 
and enormity analyses. By responsibility I mean both particular individuals’ senses of 
responsibility as well as more generalised conceptualisations. To clarify, I will elaborate on 
the ways of understanding responsibility that I think contribute to the idea that moral 
complexity is a core element of accounts of the Holocaust. It is in the context of discussions 
of responsibility that I make the link between the twin tensions of complexity and enormity 
and judging and understanding. 
As a way of visualising the relationship between moral complexity and 
responsibility I additionally propose the idea of a ‘weave’ as a means of structuring the 
various understandings of responsibility. 
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I justify my attention on complexity analyses of the Holocaust because this aspect 
of the tension seems more difficult to defend in the face of the moral horror that usually 
characterises it. 
 
Moral enormity and the imperative to judge 
 
An invitation into the sort of general awe encountered in the face of enormity evaluations 
of the Holocaust is conveyed when Lawrence Langer writes, 
 
...how can we inscribe…[narratives of Holocaust experiences]…in the historical or 
artistic narratives that later will try to reduce to some semblance of order or pattern the 
spontaneous defilement implicit in such deeds? Where shall we record it in the scroll of 
human discourse? How can we enrol such atrocities in the human community…Well, 
we can’t: we require a scroll of inhuman discourse to contain them; we need a 
definition of the inhuman community…2
 
I happen to disagree with Langer’s view that such acts as those referred to by him occurred, 
in some sense, in an inhuman universe. On the contrary, part of what contributes to their 
incomprehensibility is precisely the fact that they occurred in our universe and were 
committed by people with the same sorts of strengths and weaknesses most of us possess. 
That said I also think that Langer’s sentiment does convey the power of the horror felt upon 
encountering Holocaust accounts. In a vein similar to Langer, Douglas Lackey writes: 
 
 126
Then evils of the Holocaust are so numerous, so diverse, and so extreme that at first 
sight it seems presumptuous to judge them at all, much less than to judge them by 
ordinary moral norms. Judgement requires comprehension and transcendence, and 
comprehension and transcendence of these events seems almost beyond human power. 
The ordinary moral categories feel too pale and narrow to do justice to our sense of 
condemnation…3
 
The sort of comprehension implied by Lackey is in itself difficult enough but when moral 
enormity is accompanied by moral complexity as a component of rendering morally 
intelligible, particular events and experiences, then the task is especially problematic. The 
combination of moral enormity and moral complexity with regard to the way the Holocaust 
was and continues to be understood, brings with it particular difficulties. The requirement 
of condemnation serves to restrict the capacity to comprehend the multiple moral 
dimensions that are a feature of this complex of events. Or to put it another way, the sort of 
enormity analyses often associated with the Holocaust can have the effect of obscuring the 
ways in which this same phenomenon is also morally complex. Of course, the opposite can 
also be the case. Misguided attention to the presence of complexity analyses can have the 
effect of diluting the moral enormity of such experiences. 
Part of the challenge lies in understanding the extent of the problem presented by 
the tension. Moral enormity, for instance, appears to imply straightforward accounts of the 
way moral life is assessed. Moral complexity, on the other hand, suggests that moral life is 
anything but amenable to straightforward ways of understanding what is at issue. I intend to 
demonstrate that an important hurdle lies in the attempt to understand what the nature of the 
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relationship between enormity and complexity may yield for an understanding of both 
Holocaust experiences and Michael’s personal moral quandary in The Reader. 
One particularly interesting aspect of the tension between complexity and enormity 
analyses concerns the issue of the distinction between understanding and judgment. This is 
an issue often alluded to in accounts that stress moral enormity and includes the concern 
that experiences such as those typified by the Holocaust threaten to overwhelm 
understanding. Mary Midgley, in her book Wickedness4 evokes just such a distinction in 
the context of a discussion of the factors influencing human behaviour. She writes: 
 
Infection can bring on fever, but only in creatures with a suitable circulatory system. 
Like fever, spite, resentment, envy, avarice, cruelty, meanness, hatred and the rest are 
themselves complex states, and they produce complex activities. Outside events may 
indeed bring them on, but, like other malfunctions, they would not develop if we were 
not prone to them.5
 
Midgley’s analogy entices us to pursue its implications for what they may reveal about 
individual human behaviour and the factors influencing such behaviour. For Midgley, a key 
requirement of understanding why we act the way we do is being able to recognise that 
eliciting both social and individual causes is required for properly explaining human 
wickedness. Midgely’s aim is to enquire into the question as to why people treat others and 
sometimes even themselves abominably. She wants to be able to understand why, as she 
puts it “…[people] constantly cause avoidable suffering”.6 As I indicated above this is 
never going to be straightforward. One difficulty concerns the distinction between what she 
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refers to as individual and public wickedness. The exact significance of the distinction 
becomes evident when the discussion moves to an examination of the issues surrounding 
responsibility and, in particular, judgment. Midgley recognises that some actions are 
categorically wrong. But she is less clear about how the perpetrators of such actions are to 
be placed in a discussion of responsibility. 
Midgley is well aware that judgment is sometimes necessary but she also recognises 
the complexities and difficulties that judgment entails. Such complexities very often render, 
at the very least, certain sorts of judgement problematic. Midgley’s attempt at resolving the 
problem of judgment is interesting. She continues her discussion with the claim that moral 
judgments function to ‘orient’ us as we plot our way on the path that is moral life. In other 
words, moral judgments are a necessary pre-condition for making sense of our own 
behaviour as well as the behaviour of others. However, Midgley is careful to point out that 
the requirement to judge is not a licence, as she puts it, to stone people. Rather, it is an 
important part of understanding the behaviour of others, but understanding can have the 
effect of tempering judgment and make us less prone to judging harshly. Extrapolating 
from Midgley’s position, I believe judging to be an important social practice and indeed 
that the tension is internal to the practice. The tension, though, can make moral life more 
difficult and indeed complex. So, judgment, while it is an important component of moral 
understanding, it ranks as only one component among others. 
I would want to add that whilst I find this aspect of Midgely’s argument plausible, 
there is enough evidence to indicate that people are likely to conceive of responsibility as 
entailing obligations for which a person is morally accountable. Standardly, emphasis is on 
the fulfilment or violation of those responsibilities, deserving of praise or blame, rather than 
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understanding what a particular individual might take to be his or her responsibility. This 
view is supported by the currency of such terms as ‘retributive justice’ and the proliferation 
in both Eastern and Western cultures of a mentality of harsher penalties, increasing 
incarceration rates and expanding police forces. 
Midgely of course, is not unaware of the significance of judgment as a function of 
moral understanding. She writes: 
 
General scepticism about the possibility of moral judgment, though it may look like a 
piece of neutral, formal analysis, cannot fail to act as propaganda in this contest of 
attitudes. It must make us lose confidence in our power of thinking about moral issues 
involving individuals - including ourselves. Yet this power is absolutely necessary to 
us.7
 
Judgment for Midgely, is a necessary part of what it means to be a ‘responsible agent’. This 
is a significant point because, as I argue, moral judgments are a necessary part of the way 
we arrive at moral understanding. Many situations are not able to be reckoned with 
responsibly without incorporating matters of judgment. There is a need though to 
distinguish between certain forms of judgment. To clarify, I may in one situation judge a 
person or their actions without holding them accountable in any significant sense. On the 
other hand, there are other sorts of situations requiring other sorts of judgments that, whilst 
entailing accountability, are also more problematic in the sense that they are morally 
complex. Typically such situations would encompass extenuating circumstances like 
duress, conflicting loyalties, decisions made without time to consider, a particular 
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individual’s proclivity to procrastinate and the like. It is precisely in such situations that the 
tension generated by the presence of both enormity and complexity can make certain sorts 
of judgment more difficult to defend. 
One way of establishing how it is that complexity affects judgment is by shifting the 
focus of the discussion to the relationship between judgment and responsibility. There is 
some value in placing the discussion on judgment within a more nuanced understanding of 
responsibility. It is in the above context that I again question Lawrence Langer when he 
disputes an important conclusion of Christopher Browning’s groundbreaking study8 that 
most of us are capable of becoming killers under certain circumstances. Langer seems 
distinctly uncomfortable with Browning’s position when he writes quite defensively that: 
 
The fact is that when ordinary men agree to mass murder, for whatever reasons they 
cease to be ordinary men like the rest of us and assume the role of killers.9
 
Here I think misses a crucial point. It is also arguable that ‘the rest of us’ possess the 
capacity, if circumstances are such, to commit terrible transgressions. That is what 
Browning’s study so disturbingly demonstrates. My point here is that a discussion of 
responsibility in cases such as those described by Browning is crucial not only for what it 
can tell us about why individuals do wrong but also because it is core to the case for moral 
complexity and our understanding of the form of the tension. Accounting for why people 
do wrong requires that we unpack the complex moral byways that individuals travel. 
However, it also means that we need to move away from the traditional retributive 
understandings of the function of judgment and responsibility. Thus, my account of 
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responsibility de-emphasises ideas of responsibility as accountability in favour of 
understandings that foreground responsibility as part of our engagement with others with a 
view to developing our moral competencies. 
There are benefits of a shift away from an understanding of responsibility as 
entailing too much of an emphasis on ideas of guilt, blame and punishment. Rather than 
necessarily focusing on some perceived imperative to mete out punishment or the idea that 
we treat individuals solely as responsible agents that must be held accountable, more 
nuanced ways of understanding the variety of dimensions of responsibility can be explored. 
In my account this also means maintaining a sense of the very centrality of responsibility in 
an understanding of the tension engendered by the combination of complexity and 
enormity. Let me also point out here that re-assessing how we might understand 
responsibility does not mean that the tension conveniently dissolves. On the one hand, the 
enormity of Holocaust experiences and such experiences as those that confronted Michael 
in The Reader remain intact. In some instances condemnatory statements, whilst they may 
not take the discussion very far forward, may sometimes still be appropriate. Failing to 
condemn the horror characterised by Holocaust experiences risks diminishing their moral 
significance in our eyes. Moreover, understanding the complexities of a situation, for 
example factoring in what individuals take to be their responsibilities or being able to 
account for the vulnerabilities that move people to act in reprehensible ways, complex and 
important though these issues may be, does not arguably lessen the requirement to also hold 
them accountable. However, understanding such moral complexities does lend substance to 
the case for moral complexity and may convince us to modify our judgments.  
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A weave of ways of understanding responsibility 
 
On my account, responsibility, though it may entail ascriptions of praise or blame, is not 
exhausted by them. I want to move the focus of the discussion to develop a more 
encompassing account of responsibility and how this account, in turn, lends substance to 
the claim for a tension between complexity and enormity.  
I contend that the key to understanding life as morally complex lies, in turn, with 
understanding various different but related conceptualisations of responsibility. To help to 
visualise what I am proposing I suggest that the various nuances of responsibility be 
understood as analogous to a ‘weave’ comprised of differing threads. Taken together these 
threads represent a rich though complex moral fabric in contrast to the simple but powerful 
conceptual strand of moral enormity. 
Following this analogy there are a number of different strands that can be identified 
as belonging to an understanding of responsibility. Among those that I shall discuss I find 
Primo Levi’s notion of responsibility as somehow linked to a concept of goodness, 
Margaret Walker’s ‘practices of responsibility’10 and Christopher Gowans’ ‘responsibilities 
to persons’11 particularly interesting threads. As ways of understanding responsibility they 
do not of course exhaust how we may fruitfully understand the concept yet they are core to 
my account of moral complexity. 
The first thread that I want to consider comes from a story by Primo Levi. On my 
understanding of this story Levi foregrounds the issue of responsibility in his view of how 
the Holocaust might be adequately understood. In this story and in reference to his friend 
Lorenzo, Levi evokes a strong sense of how responsibility can manifest itself even in the 
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most life diminishing of circumstances. In an account of the way camp life emptied people 
of their humanity Levi surmises: 
 
I believe that it was really due to Lorenzo that I am alive today…for his having 
constantly reminded me by his presence, by his natural and plain manner of being 
good, that there still existed…a remote possibility of good…[and]…for which it was 
worth surviving.12
 
This quotation suggests that even amidst a systematic attempt to degrade human values, a 
moral perspective, in the form of accepting responsibility for other persons, can prevail. In 
Levi’s account I interpret Lorenzo as having demonstrated the extreme importance of a 
belief in respect for self in the context of relations with the other. In the midst of this 
relationship, albeit only briefly discussed by Levi, it seems that two senses of responsibility 
and being played out. In the first instance, Levi claims that Lorenzo is in some measure, 
although perhaps even unknowingly, responsible for his survival. It also seems evident that 
Lorenzo helped to enable Levi to take responsibility for himself and so endure. Examples 
like that of Levi’s account of Lorenzo goes to the heart of what I seek to convey in the 
understanding of responsibility I am presently defending as that which serves as the 
framework of our moral understandings of ourselves. I mention the case of Levi and 
Lorenzo in order to illustrate the view that taking responsibility for one’s own situation is 
always to take responsibility within the context of our relations with others. It is within the 
context of our relations with others that we are able to grasp the dimensions of 
 134
responsibility. In another context, in an interview with Giovanna Borradori, Jacques 
Derrida said that: 
 
Responsibility for a decision, if there is any and if one must answer for it, amounts each 
time…to a transaction between the imperative for autonomy and the imperative for 
heteronomy….13
 
If I understand Derrida correctly his point is that to be responsible is to understand, in some 
sense, the plight of the other. Lorenzo’s responsibility for Levi is a paradigmatic case. My 
wider point here is that the way in which we take responsibility, in our relations with 
others, is how we come to map the complex byways of our moral relations. 
In conjunction with the view that moral life is interpersonal, that is, that it is given 
meaning by virtue of our interactions with others, I want to introduce, as another aspect of 
responsibility, the idea that moral life is culturally situated and sustained by what Margaret 
Walker refers to as ‘practices of responsibility’14 Elaborating on what she means Walker 
writes: 
 
…morality consists in a family of practices that show what is valued by making people 
accountable to each other for it. Practices of making morally evaluative judgments are 
prominent among moral practices, but they do not exhaust them. There are also habits 
and practices of paying attention, imputing states of affairs to people’s agency, 
interpreting and describing human actions, visiting blame, offering excuses, inflicting 
punishment, making amends, refining and inhibiting the experience or expression of 
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feelings, and responding in thought, act, and feeling to any of the foregoing. In all of 
these ways we express our senses of responsibility.15
 
I think that Walker has captured a very important aspect of responsibility. By linking 
responsibility to a variety of social practices, and indeed to morality itself, Walker raises 
the prospect that it is these ideas themselves that play an important part in the expression of 
our sense of responsibility. And even more to the point, moral competency of the sort 
demanded by the sort of experiences that have become a trademark of the Holocaust 
requires that we pull together and attempt to render morally intelligible this complex 
composite of practices. The sort of practices identified above by Walker offer a sense of the 
intricacies entailed in living our lives as moral beings. In their own right they reflect 
something of the complexity that I contend is central to the moral lives of human beings. If, 
on the one hand, the sorts of moral practices described by Walker entail the ascription 
and/or the taking of responsibility they also strongly suggest that such analyses are going to 
be complex. 
Another important idea connecting moral complexity with responsibility is 
Christopher Gowans’ understanding of ‘inescapable wrongdoing’.16 I suggest that Gowans’ 
idea of ‘inescapable wrongdoing’ supports the view that moral evaluations are complex. In 
his book Innocence Lost Gowans explores moral experience from the perspective of moral 
conflict and the claim that sometimes moral wrongdoing is inescapable. Gowans writes: 
 
Many philosophers maintain that in every moral conflict some course of action that is 
wholly free from wrongdoing is available to the agent (though it may be difficult, and 
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perhaps in some cases virtually impossible, to know what this action is). In my view 
these philosophers are mistaken. We may find ourselves in moral conflicts in which, 
through no fault of our own we will do something morally wrong no matter what we 
do. In these situations we may choose the lesser of two evils and hence act for the best. 
But in acting for the best we still choose an evil, and in this sense we still do something 
wrong.17
 
By challenging the idea that it is always possible to avoid moral wrongdoing Gowans is 
contributing to an old debate in Western philosophy over the status of moral dilemmas. He 
argues that although a person may decide after careful deliberation that one of two 
conflicting responsibilities is more compelling than the other, the less compelling 
responsibility does not simply disappear. Instead the secondary responsibility is at best 
subordinated in the process of prioritising. I agree with Gowans and hold that his argument 
holds even in the case of the Holocaust. The perpetrators, for example, though they knew 
they were doing something wrong could still be conflicted over what they take to be their 
responsibilities. 
A key factor in this grading of responsibilities is the idea that in situations that 
would typically constitute serious moral conflict the agent experiences, as a matter of 
course, strong emotional responses. Such emotions seem to be, at least for Gowans, prima 
facie litmus tests for the presence of moral dilemmas. In other words, feelings such as 
anguish at the time of the decision and guilt after the decision result from the recognition 
that the situation cannot be resolved in a way that avoids the feeling and knowledge of 
moral transgression. Perhaps not surprisingly, such outcomes, emotionally painful though 
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they may be, have the potential to enrich our moral lives. Consistent with this, Gowans 
writes that it is important to recognise that ‘…our affective moral responses [to certain 
situations] can be a source of moral understanding’.18 This takes me back to my earlier 
point about perpetrators. The fact that perpetrators typically felt serious emotional conflict 
over their behaviour, something that is well supported by such research as Browning’s,19 
implies some sense of a deeper moral understanding of their own behaviour even if such 
understanding does not result in changes to the way they behave in the future.  
As a means of tapping this potential for moral understanding in what he calls a 
‘logically consistent and systematic way’ Gowans, following Rawls’ conceptualisation of 
‘reflective equilibrium’ coins the term ‘reflective intuitionism’. He argues that moral 
understanding or ‘moral judgments’ as he calls them result in large part from processes that 
are more than mere gut reactions. On Gowans’ somewhat Aristotelian account, moral 
understanding comes about largely as the result of the acquisition and development of our 
experiences over time and handed down through successive generations. As for moral 
dilemmas, he is not saying that in every situation where conflicted feelings are present 
moral distress is appropriate. Rather he is stating that there are some situations where such 
feelings are appropriate and are felt intuitively. 
I believe that Gowans’ account of the factors at play in situations of moral conflict 
resonates strongly with the sort of understanding of responsibility that I am seeking to 
convey. I think that this is best demonstrated by considering the way in which he pulls his 
idea of inescapable conflict together with his understanding of responsibility. He says that 
our intuitions concerning feelings of moral anguish are best explained by the more 
fundamental proposition that in some situations moral wrongdoing is inescapable. He then 
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proceeds to show that it is on the basis of responsibilities to specific persons that 
unavoidable feelings of moral distress are grounded. It is this connection between 
responsibilities to particular people and the feelings generated by such commitments that 
are of interest for my discussion on moral complexity. In regard to this important claim 
Gowans writes: 
 
…an agent’s moral responsibilities are based on a recognition of the intrinsic and 
unique value of the particular persons (or social entities) with whom the agent has, in 
various ways, established some connection. Hence, an agent’s responsibilities are 
ultimately responsibilities to specific persons. The nature of these responsibilities is 
defined primarily by the agent’s relationship with those persons to whom he or she is 
responsible and is not simply a function of the outcome of the agent’s moral 
deliberations about what ought to be done in a given situation. For this reason 
responsibilities to specific persons may conflict. When they do, the fact that 
deliberation of necessity directs the agent to fulfil his or her responsibility to at most 
one person does not mean that the responsibility to the other person has in this situation 
been eliminated. There will thus be occasions of conflicting moral responsibilities 
when, whatever the agent does, he or she will fail to fulfil at least one of these 
responsibilities. It is with respect to moral wrongdoing in the case of not fulfilling a 
moral responsibility so defined that I believe that moral wrongdoing is sometimes 
inescapable.20
 
 139
It’s worth emphasizing that the notion of responsibility, as Gowans understands it, cannot 
simply mean that one has duties and obligations toward others. I think, and if I understand 
Gowans, responsibility, and this means moral responsibility, is bound with the nature of our 
relations with specific others. Somewhat similarly to Walker, this in turn means that 
understanding moral life more generally needs to account for the complexities surrounding 
discussions about responsibility. Gowan’s own example of Herman Melville’s disturbing 
but compelling story of Billy Budd21 is a good illustration of the sort of discussion I am 
referring to. 
I believe that whilst our responsibilities might, and likely do, entail duties and 
obligations of one sort or another such ways of understanding responsibility are, on their 
own, insufficient as explanations as to how we arrive at the place where we are able to 
decide between one responsibility and another. The reason that duties and obligations, by 
themselves, are insufficient with respect to how we understand our responsibilities, is 
because of other significant factors that complicate our understanding of our 
responsibilities. In addition to Walker’s practices of responsibility and Gowan’s 
responsibilities to specific persons such factors as the role of individual disposition, luck 
regarding one’s circumstances and others are pivotal to understanding how it is that we 
arrive at our perceptions of our responsibilities. 
It is because there are a number of significant conceptual and practical factors that 
should be considered when discussing what it is that enables us to understand our 
responsibilities that I also believe that the analogy of a weave of ways of understanding 
responsibility has merit. This is perhaps nowhere more evident than in respect to the 
attempt to understand the moral dimensions of the Holocaust. In the course of a person 
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arriving at a moral decision, a whole host of factors that relate to the ways that person 
understands their responsibilities ‘weave’ there way into the decision making process. The 
case of Hanna, the former camp guard in Schlink’s The Reader typifies this point. In the 
course of the trial during which Hanna is charged with crimes relating to selections in 
Auschwitz and the death of several hundred women who burned to death in a church, she 
speaks about her responsibilities, both to herself and others. The narrator writes that in the 
course of the trial ‘Hanna wanted to do the right thing…she took on a responsibility to 
admit what she could not deny’.22 And elsewhere we can see how Hanna recalled her 
responsibilities as a camp guard. The narrator claims that: 
 
Hanna described how the guards had agreed among themselves to tally the same 
number of prisoners [for selection and death in the gas chamber] from their six equal 
areas of responsibility.23
 
And in the case of the women who burned to death, Hanna, responding to the judge’s 
question regarding why she didn’t unlock the doors to the church claims that, ‘We couldn’t 
just let them escape! We were responsible for them…’.24 As a result of a complex 
combination of factors, amongst them the interplay of her perceptions of her 
responsibilities, her personal fears and the circumstances she found herself in, Hanna 
committed wrongs for which she would be held accountable. 
If, as I have indicated, a discussion of responsibility is to underpin an account of 
moral complexity, it is also the case that a proper understanding of moral complexity 
contributes to understanding the extent to which the tension between judging and 
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understanding is a central dimension of our moral lives. On a sympathetic reading of the 
story of Hanna we can claim to understand her account of her responsibilities yet still 
require judgment in the sense that she be held accountable for her actions. However, this 
requirement to both understand the complexities of moral life and yet hold a person 
accountable for what they do generates a tension that is unavoidable. Michael says as much 
when the narrator writes: 
 
I wanted simultaneously to understand Hanna’s crime and to condemn it. But it was too 
terrible for that. When I tried to understand it, I had the feeling I was failing to 
condemn it as it must be condemned. When I condemned it as it must be condemned, 
there was no room for understanding.25
 
Returning to Gowans, a large measure of the success of his account of responsibility rests 
on the nature of the claim of specific relationships between persons. For Gowans, 
relationships, and in turn the responsibilities that derive from these relationships stem from 
differing sorts of associations, primary and otherwise, between individuals. In other words, 
moral responsibilities derive from particular concrete relationships such as those typified by 
relations of kinship, friendship and love.26 The example of Michael in Schlink’s The 
Reader is relevant here. Because of his past relationship with Hanna, as lovers, and because 
of his belief that a miscarriage of justice had occurred, Michael felt he had to act in her 
defence. His understanding of his responsibility toward Hanna was also based on the 
knowledge that he alone had regarding her illiteracy. Even in the presence of this deep 
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understanding, but because of all the layers of complexity that it entailed, he was conflicted 
by the need to judge her for what she had done. 
Gowans’ account of responsibilities to specific persons as substantively informed 
by the nature of relationships between intimates represents an important insight into the 
way responsibilities are formed more generally. Moreover, I think the value of Gowans’ 
account lies in its ability to unravel aspects of the practical operations of our moral 
relations. 
One of the examples that Gowans uses is that based on the sort of intimate 
relationship between a parent and child.27 In this example he describes the responsibility of 
a parent to nurture his or her child. Such responsibility, it is argued, comes from a number 
of sources not least of which is the accepted knowledge that the infant in question is his or 
her child and as such would usually be regarded as intrinsically and uniquely valuable. 
Gowan’s intent is to establish a connection between this primary relationship and the way 
we perceive the morality of our relations more generally. He is suggesting that the way 
people with whom we do not share a close relation or even a distant relation may still be 
regarded as intrinsically valuable on the basis of the way we understand ideas of value and 
responsibility toward those with whom we are close. In this way Gowans builds an account 
of morality extrapolating from relations with intimates. 
 
The case for moral complexity 
 
The discussion of responsibility to date, from Levi to Walker to Gowans is intended to 
show how the various ways of understanding responsibility contributes to an account of 
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moral life, characterised by a tension between moral complexity and moral enormity. 
Gowans identifies how inescapable wrongdoing and moral conflict stem in turn from 
understandings of responsibility built up from among other things our ties with intimates. I 
am arguing that these concerns, moral conflict and responsibilities to persons, together with 
ideas of taking responsibility for ones self, other practices of responsibility and such 
accompanying issues as individual disposition, circumstances, luck and the like comprise 
the elements of the complexity of moral life. In short, these elements of moral life ensure 
that moral life is morally complex. In turn it is these same elements of moral life that enable 
us to understand why it is as difficult as it is compelling to judge perpetrators of crimes and 
indeed how it is that people commit such crimes in the first instance.  
There is a key moment in The Reader that captures this tension poignantly. When 
questioned about her role and personal culpability in the selection of prisoners to be sent to 
the gas chambers Hanna answers with a question for the judge that goes to the heart of the 
claim for the moral complexity of moral life. She asks, or perhaps pleads, ‘I…I mean…so 
what would you have done?’28 The answer that the judge provides is starkly abstract and 
stripped of any real appreciation of what Hanna was asking, rendering it most 
unsatisfactory to all who heard it. What Hanna deserved to hear by way of an answer was 
what she should have actually done taking into account all facets of the complexity of 
moral life. The very tension at issue is what characterises the question and what makes it 
impossible to answer satisfactorily. The answer that she received was a statement of the 
obvious. What she received was a statement of what she shouldn’t have done. Yes her 
situation had been morally perilous but it had been made so by the moral complexity of her 
predicament. 
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By engaging directly with the judge Hanna is engaging with us all. This is a 
question for all who would seek to judge the Hannas of this world. It is a question that 
exposes the moral vulnerabilities in us all. It is a question that puts us all in her shoes and 
confronts all of us with the stark possibility that as fellow human beings we cannot 
guarantee that we would have behaved any differently faced with same set of moral 
complexities. 
Following Gowans, an important part of our moral response to a particular situation 
should be based around an understanding of the wellbeing of the other, whomever that 
other may be. In the process of deliberating about the nature of our responsibilities to a 
specific person in a specific situation one vital concern ought to be maintenance of the well 
being of the other. Of course, because of the wide variety of factors operating at the 
interface of deliberation and decision many different moral outcomes are possible. This is 
also why in concrete and often complex situations, the ways in which we understand our 
responsibilities can, and do, emerge in ways that generate conflict. The case of Hanna is a 
prime example.  
Of related importance to the case for moral complexity, is the claim that moral life 
generally is characterised by complexity analyses. Among the most powerful 
representations of this claim, in my view, are accounts of Holocaust experiences. Though 
this discussion has dwelt on the story of Hanna, the tension between complexity and 
enormity that such stories generate is not restricted to the perpetrators of crimes. In an 
interview with Claude Lanzmann, Auschwitz survivor Abraham Bomba, tells a story that 
conveys a powerful sense of the tension between complexity and enormity in its 
combination of ways of understanding responsibilities, individual dispositions, massively 
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impoverished circumstances and the gamut of conflicted emotions that you might expect to 
accompany such a story. Recounting Bomba’s story the narrator writes: 
 
I want to tell you something that happened. At the gas chamber, when I was chosen to 
work there as a barber, some of the women that came in on a transport from my town 
of Czestochowa, I knew a lot of them. I knew them; I lived with them in my town. I 
lived with them in my street, and some of them were my close friends. And when they 
saw me, they started asking me, Abe this and Abe that - ‘What’s going to happen to 
us?’ What could you tell them? What could you tell? A friend of mine worked as a 
barber - he was a good barber from my home town- when his wife and his sister came 
into the gas chamber…. I can’t. It’s too horrible. Please. 
We have to do it. You know it. 
I won’t be able to do it. 
You have to do it. I know it’s very hard. I know and I apologise. 
Don’t make me go on please. 
Please. We must go on. 
I told you today it’s going to be very hard. They were taking that in bags and 
transporting it to Germany. 
Okay, go ahead. What was his answer when his wife and sister came? 
They tried to talk to him and the husband of his sister. They could not tell them 
this was the last time they stay alive, because behind them was the German Nazis, SS 
men, and they knew that if they said a word, not only the wife and the woman, who 
were dead already, but also they would share the same thing with them. In a way, they 
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tried to do the best for them, with a second longer, just to hug them and kiss them, 
because they knew they would never see them again.29
 
It should be borne in mind that the use of this example is not to serve as a point of reference 
to the story of Hanna. The two stories are clearly on a different moral footing and the 
distinction between victim and perpetrator is important. Nevertheless, both stories convey 
the strength of the tension between both the enormity and the complexity of the events 
portrayed. Albeit from very different perspectives both stories convey the sense of moral 
failure felt by those involved. 
 
Toward an understanding of moral life 
 
Both moral complexity and moral enormity are present in Holocaust experiences and with 
respect to such experiences they are manifest in the deliberations that take place around our 
understandings of our responsibilities to self and others. My claim is that such deliberations 
with all that this implies, including the tension between judging and understanding, are 
what constitutes the moral complexity of our lives. 
In the context of Michael’s moral dilemma in The Reader, the discussion on moral 
complexity delivered a stark conclusion. Like Michael, if I the reader err too much on the 
side of judging the character of Hanna I run the risk of failing to understand her place in the 
course of events. Indeed I may fail to understand period. If, on the other hand, I factor in 
the moral complexity of her situation I arrive at the conclusion that, in her shoes, I cannot 
guarantee I would have behaved differently. Such a conclusion has the potential to 
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compromise judgment. Yet judgment remains important. It is this predicament that 
underpins the tension between judging and understanding. Hanna made some poor 
decisions that led to terrible outcomes. Yet our deeper understanding of the moral 
complexity of her situation ought to acknowledge the need for a more reflective and 
compassionate appraisal of her. Such is moral life. 
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